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ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS: REVIVING
THE VOIR DIRE FOR CHILD WITNESSES
Lucy S. McGought

INTRODUCTION

Cain was the first child witness, but the chronicler of Genesis
did not preserve Cain's account of his family's struggle to adjust
beyond Eden. Had Cain told his story, would he have been
credible? We know that in early adolescence he lied to God to
cover up the killing of his brother.l We don't know whether our
skepticism of children's testimony stems from Cain's example,
but for centuries we have been unsure of all children's accounts.
Debate rages even today over whether children, particularly
child victims of serious assaults, should testify in open court.
The highly publicized California "McMartin preschool prosecution"
gave rise to a wave of statutory and trial innovations aimed at
insulating child witnesses from courtroom trauma.2
Recent literature and jurisprudence that consider both novel
and traditional evidentiary procedures, however, express little

t Vinson & Elkins Professor of Law, Louisiana State University, College of Law.
B.A. 1962, Agnes Scott College; J.D. 1966, Emory University; LL.M. 1971, Harvard
University. lowe a very special debt of gratitude to Ben F. Johnson, the first Dean of
Georgia State University, College of Law, for making my legal education possible and
for later hiring me as a colleague at Emory Law School. Acknowledgement is also due
the W.K. Kellogg Foundation for its support of my interest in interdisciplinary work
during my fellowship years, to my former research assistants, Kimberly Wooten and
Mark Hornsby, and to Professor James W. Bowers of the Louisiana State University
faculty.
1. Genesis 4:1-11 (King James).
2. People v. Buckey, No. A·750900 (Cal. Crim. Dist. Ct., 1984). See, e.g., Hoffenberg
& Skuthan, Protecting Children in the Courts, 59 FLA. B.J., Oct. 1985, at 14-20. See infra
notes 93-97 and accompanying text. The United States Supreme Court has rejected one
such innovation, the "one-way screen," because the screen denies a defendant's rights
under the confrontation clause. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988) (two thirteen-year-old
girls testified, with one-way screening device in place, against defendant accused of
sexually molesting them).
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concern for the reliability of children's testimony.3 Furthermore,
most reforms have focused exclusively upon innovations affecting
only criminal prosecutions. If the reliability of child witnesses is
a genuine concern, then rule reform should extend to both criminal
and civil trials. This Article will ask the fundamental question:
If children are to be both seen and heard in court, what safeguards,
if any, are necessary to minimize the likelihood of their giving
false testimony?
Part I of this Article examines the traditional rules of evidence
to expose our beliefs regarding the special reliability risks of
children's testimony. Currently, in the United States, three
different approaches concerning child witnesses vie for acceptance.
These three approaches are the federal or "no inquiry" approach,
the "oath understanding" rule, and the "full inquiry" rule. 4
The federal approach, embraced in the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence in 1979, eliminates preliminary inquiry into a
child's truthfulness. Instead, the child, like every other witness,
may give his testimony under oath subject to cross-examination
and to a limited number of exclusionary objections. Competency
issues are thus converted into credibility issues. In state courts,
a majority of jurisdictions still preserve the voir dire process for
child witnesses; they differ, however, on the appropriate subject
3. All of the Coy opiniOns, including that of the Supreme Court, express the dilemma
as a choice between protecting children and a defendant's right to a fair trial, specifically
the right to confront his accusers. That reliability of an accuser's testimony is somehow
served by eye·to-eye contact with the accused is only obliquely suggested by Justice
Scalia in the Court's plurality opinion. He asserts, with no reference to empirical data
and without acknowledgement that reliability is even ascertainable: "That face·to·face
presence may, unfortunately, upset the truthful rape victim or abused child; but by the
same token it may confound and undo the false accuser, or reveal the child coached by
a malevolent adult. It is a truism that constitutional protections have costs." Coy, 108 S.
Ct. at 2802. Precisely what those costs are is not a truism.
4. Some states still use the presumptions developed by English law, that is, that a
child over a certain age, usually fourteen, is presumptively competent, but younger
children must. be specially qualified through a threshold voir dire before being permitted
to give testimony. This view does not, however, represent a truly different approach to
the voir dire process. States retaining age-bound presumptions have simply redefined the
category of "children." Such presumptions only allocate burdens of proof, serving as a
crude sorting device to determine when special competency proofs are necessary; they
do not offer guidance about what questions are relevant to competency. The use of such
presumptions begs the more fundamental question of the proper scope of inquiry when
a child is offered as a witness. Regardless of how the term "child" is defined, is any voir
dire necessary to screen for reliability risks of a child witness and, if so, what risks are
to be taken into account? Cj. D. WHITCOMB, E. SHAPmO & L. STELLWAGEN, WHEN THE
VICTIM Is A CHILD: ISSUES FOR JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS 27-39 (National Institute of
Justice, Issues and Practices in Criminal Justice, 1985).
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matter and scope of such questioning. Some states focus
exclusively upon whether the child can demonstrate an
understanding of the obligation to tell the truth-the "oath
understanding" rule. Others permit a more freewheeling probe
into the child's moral and cognitive development-the "full
inquiry" rule. None of these approaches examines the real
reliability risks inherent in children's testimony.
Part II explores the function of the voir dire process. Such a
process is useful only if it tests for and can eliminate the most
likely reliability risks. Current empirical data show that the three
risks which pose the greatest potential for distortion in children's
testimony are memory-fade, suggestibility, and imaginative
recreation. This Article closes with suggestions to reform the
current oath administration and voir dire processes by tailoring
them to eliminate these three reliability risks.
1.

ApPROACHES TO THE QUALIFICATION OF CHILD WITNESSES

Any witness' basic task is to give an accurate report of an
accurate perception of some past event. Perceptual accuracy is
meaningless unless the witness speaks truthfully. However, a
commitment to tell the truth is meaningless unless the witness
can form a perception of the observed event accurately.
Historically, the law has used the oath ceremony and the voir
dire, or preliminary examination, to test both the cognitive skills
and the truthfulness of a proposed child witness.
Classic jurisprudential analysis of witness capacity uses
Wigmore's categories.5 The essential components are that the
witness demonstrate a capacity for observation, for recollection
and for communication. Communication capacity, in turn, is
composed of two elements: an ability to understand and respond
intelligently to questions, and a sense of "moral responsibility,"
defined as a "consciousness of the duty to speak the truth."6
Accurate perception includes Wigmore's first two components of
observation and recollection; accurate reporting includes both
parts of Wigmore's third requirement-the ability to communicate
and the felt obligation to communicate truthfully.
The duty of accurate reporting, symbolized by the oath, is a
directly enforceable obligation. Any witness knowingly giving
5. 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 506, at 712-13 (J. Chadbourn
rev. ed. 1979).

6. Id.
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false testimony can be convicted of perjury. Accurate perception
should be an equally serious concern but it is unenforceable by
any direct sanctions against the witness. Instead, the concern for
accurate perception is enforced only indirectly through rules
aimed at preventing a witness' testimony altogether or discounting
its effect. The initial concern of recorded law, a concern which
still preoccupies courts today, is accuracy of reporting. Far less
attention has been devoted to children's accuracy of perception.
Over time and through different cultures, preliminary assurance
of a witness' truthfulness has been sought. Some methods,7 like
the rack and screw, were very compelling; but all methods,
including the modern oath, serve notice that the truth is a societal
expectation and command. The modern oath has been pared to
a symbolic reminder of this expectation.

A. The "Oath Understanding" Test
Both common and civil law regarded child witnesses as suspect,
only a short step removed from the perceived unreliability of
imbeciles and lunatics. Reasons underlying this skepticism were
not clearly differentiated. However, because of the spiritual
immaturity of a child, his ability to appreciate an oath taken
before God eclipsed all other possible concerns. Most children
were precluded from testifying "because of their supposed inability
to understand the significance of the oath" in a religious sense.8
It is not altogether clear whether the early justification for
finding children incompetent was the child's susceptibility to
adult influence,9 the child's inability to distinguish truth from
7. For an intriguing, though unannotated, array of truth·seeking rituals from differing
cultures, see Note, The Oath as an Aid in Securing Trustworthy Testimony, 10 TEX. L.
REV. 64 (1931-32).
8. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE S 601[04], at 32 (1988).
9. The taproot of testimonial disqualification is the law's early skepticism about
witnesses' potential self·interest. Under Roman law, self·interest was broadly extended
to include family members as well. Family interdependence, both affectional and economic,
was thought to be a sufficiently strong incentive for perjury that parties' spouses and
children were precluded from testifying; this same bond could be used to diminish the
credibility of the testimony of domestic servants. LA. CIV. CODE of 1925 art. 2260, repealed
by Acts of 1916, No. 157. English law, until the mid·nineteenth century, disqualified both
plaintiffs and defendants from giving testimony in their own cause of acti(ln. 2 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 5, S 602, at 736. The English law, however, never extended the self·interest
disqualification beyond spouses. ld. at S 600, 731 n.3. Even though AngJo.American
doctrine never used familial self·interest to disqualify children, lawmakers have long
entertained grave doubts about children's ability to make autonomous testimonial choices
adverse to the family's interest. Children's presupposed "suggestibility," which surfaces
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fantasy, or a combination of these two presumptions. For whatever
reason, until late in the eighteenth century, English courts did
not permit children under the age of fourteen to give testimony.1o
At that time, children aged fourteen and over became
presumptively competent to take the oath and testify.u
In 1778, when English law first permitted children to testify,
the test for competency was oath understanding. Children could
be heard provided that they "possess[ed] a sufficient knowledge
of the nature and consequence of an oath . . . . [A]dmissibility
depends up on the sense and reason they entertain of the danger
and impiety of falsehood."12 Wigmore reported that "[i]t is not
always possible to determine whether the language of the [English]
Courts is used in view of the oath-test or of an independent
testimonial requirement."13 However, Wigmore concluded that
the English rule was focused primarily on the child's understanding
of the oath.14
often in legal commentary and decisions, seems to be an offshoot of this self-interest
taproot. As but one example, the West Virginia Supreme Court confidently asserted in
1893: "[Children] are as clay in the potter's hand, to be moulded, some to honor and some
to dishonor. Lacking conscientiousness, they repeat with phonographic precision the things
that have been told them to say, be they true or false." State v. Michael, 37 W. Va. 565,
569, 16 S.E. 803, 804 (1893).
10. Common law distinctions extended to several other classes of persons. See, e.g., 8
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2181, at 6 (J. McNaughton rev. ed.
19611 (officers of justice, including judges, jurors, and attorneys are improper witnesses);
2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, S 518, at 725 (insufficient religious belief necessary to take
oath was ground for disqualification at common law!; 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, §§
519-20, at 725-30 (any person convicted of treason or certain crimes requiring fraud
or deceit were not considered competent witnesses at common law!; 2 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 5, §S 576-77, at 810-19 (disqualification of any witness having an interest in the
pending cause, including parties); 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, §§ 600-01, at 856-61 (a
spouse of any party could not serve as witness at common law); 2 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 5, S§ 492-500, at 697-709 (any witness who was insane, an idiot, or intoxicated
was not competent to testify at common law).
11. See B. JONES, JONES ON EVIDENCE § 20:10, at 605 (6th ed. 1972). Presumptive
competence for individuals over the age of fourteen is thought to be a vestige of canonical
influence in the early development of English law. Rowley, The Competency oj Witnesses,
24 IOWA L. REV. 482, 488 (1939).
12. The King v. Brasier, 1 Leach 199, 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (1779) (announcing that there
was no longer a per se rule forbidding the receipt of a child's testimony based exclusively
upon the child's age).
13. 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 505, at 595.
14. !d. The "oath understanding" rule developed at common law although England
has now abrogated this test for competency. The modern English rule, now in effect for
a half-century, permits a "child of tender years" to testify if, "in the opinion of the court,
he is possessed of sufficient intelligence to justify the reception of the evidence, and
understands the duty of speaking the truth." Children and Young Persons Act, 1933, 23
& 24 Geo. 5, ch. 12, § 38. Within the classification scheme of this Article, England would
now fall within the "full inquiry" rule category.

Published by Reading Room, 1989

HeinOnline -- 5 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 561 1988-1989

5

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 3

562

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vo1.5:557

Several states still screen child witnesses by focusing exclusively
on the child's ability to understand an oath.15 According to this
rule, if a child demonstrates an understanding of the obligation
to tell the truth, he is competent to relate his perceptions even
if there are reasons to believe his perceptions are faulty. At
times, the "oath understanding" voir dire addresses general
cognitive capacity. Generally, however, issues of the perceptual
accuracy of the child's recollection are reserved for crossexamination.
For example, in an Alabama murder prosecution, the state
offered a five-year-old witness. After preliminary inquiry by the
court, defense counsel renewed its motion to suppress because
"[h]e has shown no knowledge of God, and that God awards for
the truth and avenges for falsehood. He has no comprehension
of the solemnity of the oath . . . ." At this point, the trial court
resumed control of the voir dire:
THE COURT: Okay. Dennis, do you know what it means to
tell the truth?
(NO ANSWER FROM THE WITNESS)
THE COURT: Do you know what it means to swear to tell
the truth and to take an oath?
THE WITNESS: Db-huh.
THE COURT: What do you do when you swear to tell the
truth?
THE WITNESS: When you tell the truth you have got to
tell the truth.
THE COURT: Okay. Anything else from the State?
[STATE'S COUNSEL]: I don't have anything.
THE COURT: All right, come down.
(WITNESS LEAVES THE WITNESS STAND)
THE COURT: Okay, I am going to overrule your Motion. I
am going to allow him to testify.I6
15. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. S 24-9-5 (1982): "Persons who do not have the use of reason,
such as idiots, lunatics during lunacy, and children who do not understand the nature of
an oath, shall be incompetent witnesses."
16. Harville v. State, 386 So. 2d 776, 779 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980). In this portion of
this voir dire, the court summarized a previous inquiry. The inquiry was a series of
leading questions that never elicited any demonstration of an appreciation of consequences
attached to falsehood. But see Cole v. State, 443 So. 2d 1386 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983).
Although the appellate court dutifully cites the Alabama "oath understanding" statute,
ALA. CODE S 12-21-165 (1975), it apparently applies a full inquiry rule:
The courts of this state have not set a limit for children of tender age to
testify. It is the duty of the trial court to examine a child of tender years,
and in its discretion determine if the child has sufficient intelIigence to
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Any preliminary inquiry by the court requires a specific purpose.
A limited purpose of the oath-understanding voir dire is to ensure
that the child understands his duty to report accurately or be
punished for perjury. In contrast, a broader purpose of the oathunderstanding inquiry is to probe the child's propensity for truthtelling. Because some jurisdictions authorize an examination for
this broader purpose, it is important to consider the fruitfulness
of such a procedure.
Diogenes might never have found an "honest child" had he
been equipped only with this type of voir dire procedure. The
effectiveness of a search for honesty or truthfulness through
propounded questions is easily discredited by our recorded
experience. Jurisprudence shows many, often bizarre, accounts
of judicial frustration caused by attempts to apply the oathunderstanding rule.
For example, in Commonwealth v. Tatisos,17 the child appeared
"bright and intelligent, and her answers are direct." In response
to questions about the oath, however, she responded only that it
was wrong to tell lies and if she did, a whipping would follow.
Thereupon, the court adjourned the voir dire until the girl could
take religious instruction so she could learn to appreciate the
significance of the oath.ls
Unlike Tatisos, no state court today would focus its inquiry on
the theological basis of an oath,19 but courts have been given
sUbstantial, even unbridled, discretion to question the witness'
beliefs and moral principles. Some courts take a philological tack
by inquiring literally into the meaning of the word "oath."20
Critics have observed that "[e]ven mature and intelligent laymen

observe, recollect, and narrate what occurs, and has sufficient mental capacity
to be a witness.
ld. at 1390.
17. 238 Mass. 322, 130 N.E. 495 (1921).
18. Commonwealth v. Tatisos, 238 Mass. at 323-24, 130 N.E. at 496-97.
19. As of 1970, the religious conviction prerequisite has been statutorily abandoned
in all states. 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW S 1828 (J. Chadbourn
rev. ed. 1976). For discussion of the religious conviction requirement, see Note, WitnessesCompetency-Child Wlw Denied Belief in God Ruled Cwnpetent Witness, 38 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 95 (1962-1963); Comment, The Problem of the Child Witness-A Question of
Competency, 32 CONN. L. REV. 103 (1958); and Comment, Youth a.s a Bar to Testimonial
Competence, 8 ARK. L. REV. 100 (1953-1954).
20. &e Zilinmon v. State, 234 Ga. 535, 537, 216 S.E.2d 830, 832 (1975) (affirming the
exclusion of a seven-year-old defense witness because he did not demonstrate an understanding of the "meaning of an oath").
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might be somewhat put to it to give a definition that would
strike the fancy of every court."21
Even if there were consensus about the responses sought by
a broad oath-understanding voir dire, social science research
indicates that some children, particularly younger ones, are
disadvantaged in comprehending the usual questions asked. The
following series of model questions are suggested to attorneys
who are faced with the task of qualifying a child witness under
the oath understanding approach:
H you told these people a story, or something that wasn't
true, what would happen to you?
A. I'd be punished.
Q. Who would punish you?
A. God.
Q.

Q. What would happen to you?
A. I wouldn't go to heaven.:?::!

Researchers have proposed a four-level scale of cognitive
complexity in human communication. 23 Level IV, the most
sophisticated scale of discourse, requires a child to process his
perceptual experiences through what are termed "simple
conditionals;" for example, the child might be asked, "What would
you do if you found a lost puppy?"24 Consequently, the very
phrasing of the inquiry has substantial influence on a child's
ability to respond. Hypotheticals, such as the model question
21. Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Obs&rVations on the Law of Evidew:e-The Competency
of Witnesses, 37 YALE L.J. 1017, 1019 (1928). Among other data, this article collects a
number of cases involving competency voir dires of children.
22. Perry & Teply, Interviewing, Counseling, and In-Court Examination of Children:
Practical Approaches for Attorneys, 18 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1369, 1405 n.187 (1984-1985)
(quoting 35 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2d, QWJlifying Child Witness to Testify S 12, at
683-84 (1983)).
23. M. BLANK, S. ROSE, & L. BERLlN, THE LANGUAGE OF LEARNING: THE PRESCHOOL
YEARS (1978); Blank & Franklin, Dialogue with Preschoolers: A Cognitively-Based System
of Assessment, 1 ApPLIED PSYCHOLINGUISTICS 127 (1980). The four levels are: matching,
selective analysis, reordering, and reasoning about experience. Id. at 130. The levels
represent a scale of cognitive complexity ranging from the simplest, calling an object by
its name (matching experience); through the slightly more complex behaviors of describing
objects' characteristics (selective analysis) and forming patterns and sequences (reordering
experience); to the most complex cognitive communication which is identifying causes
and giving explanations (reasoning about experience). Id. at 135. Children develop along
this scale as they mature. Id. at 128.
24. Gordon, Adequacy of Responses Given by Low-Income and Middle-Income Kindergarten Children in Structured Adult-Child Conversations, 20 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
881, 885 (1984).
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above, require this Level IV capability. Such questions can
befuddle a child who is truthful and predisposed to relate
accurately. The purpose of the inquiry is thus defeated.25
Even when the question can be understood, global abstractions
are not likely to adduce meaningful responses. For example,
consider another staple of oath-understanding voir dire:
Do you know the differences between right and wrong?
A. Yes.
Q. What is the difference?
A. When I do things right, I'm a good boy, and when I do
things wrong, I'm a bad boy.26
Q.

Social science research has documented little correlation
between age and honesty.27 However, a substantial body of moral
development theory explains why children at different
developmental stages may be motivated to tell the truth. As a
child grows older his reasons for telling the truth may change
to include a perceived duty to society and to the criminal justice
system.28 However, cognitive sophistication, not motivation, is
required to discuss truth. "[A]sking a child to tell the meaning
of 'truth,' 'oath,' or 'God' [or distinguish between right and wrong]
probably tells more about his or her intellectual development
than about the child's propensity to tell the truth."29
The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule of Evidence
601 argues that:
No mental or moral qualifications for testifying as a witness
are specified. Standards of mental capacity have proved elusive in actual application . . .. Standards of moral qualification in practice consist essentially of evaluating a person's

25. See Perry & Teply, supra note 22, at 1371-74. They conclude: "Because of these
advances in logical reasoning and memory encoding strategies, six to twelve-year-old
children should be considered better witnesses than younger children. On the other hand,
they are not yet equipped to handle either abstract, hypothetical dilemmas or situations
that require an assessment of relative ethics." ld. at 1373.
26. Perry & Tepley, supra note 22, at 683-84.
27. See Goodman, Aman & Hirschman, Child Sexual Abuse and Physical Abuse: Children's Testimony, in CHILDREN'S EYEWITNESS MEMORY 16 (S. Ceci, M. Toglia & D. Ross
ed. 1987). See also Melton, Children's Competency to Testify, 5 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR
73, 79 (1981). Melton wryly notes that there appears to be only a "rather modest"
correlation between strongly asserted moral judgments and actual moral behavior. ld. at
n.19.
28. T. LICKONA, RAISING GOOD CHILDREN: HELPING YOUR CHILD THROUGH THE STAGES
OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT (1983).
29. Melton, supra note 27, at 79.
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truthfulness in terms of his own answers about it. Their
principal utility is in affording an opportunity on voir dire
examination to impress upon the witness his moral duty. This
result may, however, be accomplished more directly, and
without haggling in terms of legal standards, by the manner
of administering the oath or affirmation under Rule 603.30

Thus, the Committee justified discarding the oath-understanding
voir dire in the federal system.
Those states which have adopted the oath-understanding rule
are motivated by a proper concern, but the voir dire is the wrong
procedure to address this issue.31 Qualifying a child as a witness
based solely upon his abstract appreciation of an oath's obligations
is a test that is both overinclusive and underinclusive. It can
exclude some linguistically unsophisticated but truly reliable
younger witnesses, while failing to exclude the unreliable. In
sum, the use of the oath-understanding voir dire to test a child's
truthful predisposition appears to be an even less satisfactory
measure with children than with adults. Such a process should
be abandoned as confusing to many children and nearly always
futile.

B. The ((Full Inquiry" Test
Under this approach, a broad inquiry into both the appreciation
of the obligation to tell the truth and perceptual accuracy is
authorized. Washington is one example of a jurisdiction that
adhered to this rule. 32 The Washington Supreme Court has found
the following factors relevant to the assessment of children's
competency:
(1) an understanding of the obligation to speak the truth on
the witness stand; (2) the mental capacity at the time of the
occurrence concerning which he is to testify, to receive an
accurate impression of it; (3) a memory sufficient to retain an
independent recollection of the occurrence; (4) the capacity to

30. FED. R. EVID. 601 advisory committee's note.
3!' See infra

S III.

32. The Washington Code provided: "The following persons shall not be competent to
testify . . . Children under ten years of age, who appear incapable of receiving just
impressions of the facts, respecting which they are examined, or of relating them truly."
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. S 5.60.050 (1963). In 1986, an amendment to this statute deleted
the words "children under ten years of age." Thus, section 5.60.050 now classifies as
incompetent only those intoxicated and "of unsound mind," as well as persons "incapable
of receiving just impressions of the facts." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. S 5.60.050 (Supp. 1989).
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express in words his memory of the occurrence; and (5) the
capacity to understand simple questions about it.33

In a jurisdiction which uses the factors listed above to assess
competency, voir dire questions should cover a wide area yet
indirectly produce important information on the subject of
competency. For instance, a trial judge has provided a vivid
illustration of how the competency voir dire should be conducted
in a jurisdiction which has adopted the "full inquiry" rule:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

What is your name?
Katherine Anne Craig.
How are you feeling today, Katherine?
Fine.
What are the names of your mother and father?

A.
Q.
Q.
Q.
Q.
Q.
Q.
Q.
Q.
Q.
Q.
Q.

Do you have any brothers and sisters?
Do they live at home?
By the way, how do you spell your name?
How old are you, Katherine?
When is your birthday?
How did you get here today?
Do you know what building you are in now?
What town are you in now?
Where do you live?
What school do you go to?
How far do you live from school?34

The trial judge noted that competency assessing questions
should be not only simple and easy to answer for the child, but
should also help to relax the child through familiarity. Certain
topics must be covered to form a basis for a competency
determination and to enable the interrogator to pursue other
important questions.a5 These questions include:
1. General questions about the home and members of the
family;
2. Questions about his schooling, including his grade, present
teachers, former teachers, subjects studied, class standing,
grades received in former years, regularity of promotion,

33. State v. Allen, 70 Wash. 2d 690, 692, 424 P.2d 1021, 1022 (1967) (child's age of six
did not, as a matter of law, disqualify child as a witness). See also State v. Hunsaker, 39
Wash. App. 489, 693 P.2d 724 (1984) (four-year-old child and two-and-a-half-year-old child
not presumed incompetent based on age alone).
34. Stafford, The Child as a Witness, 37 WASH. L. REV. 303, 315 (1962).
35. ld. at 316.
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failures, if any, favorite subjects, attendance record and extracurricular activities. If the child is of preschool age, or is
very young, he should also be tested on his ability to count,
read and spell simple words;
3. Questions about his attendance at church or sunday school,
including his frequency of attendance, names of his teachers,
pastors and location of the church;
4. Questions to demonstrate his knowledge of the difference
between the truth and a falsehood, that it is wrong to lie and
the consequences of telling a lie; and
5. Lastly, the child should be asked some questions to dispel
the possibility of coaching. A child that has been coached is
suspect. In this regard, the following type of questions would
be appropriate.
Q. Have we met before, Katherine?
A. Yes.
Q. Where?
A. At your office.
Q. When was that?
A. Last Saturday.
Q. Was anyone else in the room?
A. Yes.
Q. Who?
A. My dad and my sister Joan.
Q. What did we talk about?
A. About what I'd seen at the wreck.
Q. Did I tell you about the wreck, or did you tell me?
A. I told you.
Q. Did I tell you what to say in court?
A. Yes.
Q. What did I tell you to say?
A. To tell everything I know.
Q. Did I tell you anything else?
A. You said to tell the truth.36
A child witness should also be asked questions relevant to the
subject on which she is testifying. Thus, for a child testifying
about her observations of an automobile accident, the pivotal test
should not be current intelligence, proper orientation in time and
space, or memory of irrelevant everyday or academic learning

36. Id. at 316-17. Although this voir dire addresses suggestibility, no facts about the
number, nature, and scope of pretrial interviews are sought or elicited. Furthermore, the
"Shirley Temple" responses reinforce our worst fears about coaching.
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but the accuracy of a witness' perception and memory of the
past observed event.37

c.

The uNo Inquiry" or Federal Approach

In view of the weaknesses of both the oath-understanding and
full-inquiry approaches, it is not surprising that critics have called
for their abandonment. By far the most powerful critic was John
Wigmore, then Dean at Northwestern University School of Law.
In 1940, he wrote:
A rational view of the peculiarities of child-nature, and of
the daily course of justice in our courts, must lead to the
conclusion that the effort to measure a priori the degrees of
trustworthiness in children's statements, and to distinguish
the point at which they cease to be totally incredible and
acquire suddenly some degree of credibility, is futile and
unprofitable . . . . Recognizing on the one hand the childish
disposition to weave romances and to treat imagination for
verity, and on the other the rooted ingenuousness of children
and their tendency to speak straightforwardly what is in their
minds, it must be concluded that the sensible way is to put
the child upon the stand and let it tell its story for what it
may seem to be worth.38

Forty years later, the Wigmore position was incorporated into
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Under the federal approach, no
special precautions need be taken insofar as a child witness is
concerned, either as to his appreciation of the duty to tell the
truth or the accuracy of his present perceptions of the event
that is to be remembered. Although every witness is administered
an oath in the federal system,39 there is no separate requirement

37. See Edmondson v. United States, 346 A.2d 515 (D.C. App. 1975). The defendant
asserted that the failure of a seven·year-old witness to recall, during voir dire, the name
of her kindergarten teacher who had taught her the previous year demonstrated her
incompetency. Rejecting this argument, the court observed that the proper test was the
"child's ability to recollect the events about which she was to testify." ld. at 516.
38. 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, S 509, at 600. Wigmore paraphrases Chief Judge
Campbell in Hughes v. Detroit, G.H. & M.R.R., 65 Mich. 10, 31 N.W. 605 (1887).
39. Rule 603 states: "Before testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that
the witness will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form calculated
to awaken the witness' conscience and impress the witness' mind with the duty to do
so." FED. R. EVID. 603.
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that a child be questioned about the significance of the obligation
to tell the truth.40
The Federal Rules of Evidence also abolish all age-bound
presumptions of incompetency.41 When a child is offered as a
witness, opposing counsel has only the general grounds for
challenge which would govern the testimony of any proffered
witness. These objections include irrelevancy, such as lack of
personal knowledge, or prejudicial or cumulative evidence.42
As one federal circuit court correctly predicted in 1979:
If these views [of the Advisory Committee which drafted
the Federal Rules of Evidence] are to be rigorously adhered
to, there seems no longer to be any occasion for judicially-

40. Rule 603 relies on the form of the oath or affirmation to reinforce the duty to tell
the truth. The Advisory Committee rejected the view that a voir dire into oath·understanding and acceptance of its duty was authorized under this Rule. Apparently, appreciation of the duty to tell the truth is foreclosed as a potential challenge. This stance
may be viewed as acceptance of Wigmore's suggestion that U[t1he true purpose of the
oath is not to exclude any competent witness, but merely to add a stimulus to truthfulness
whenever such a stimulus is feasible." 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 19, S 1827, at 413.
41. Rule 601 provides:
Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in
these rules. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an
element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of
decision, the competency of a witness shall be determined in accordance with
State law.
FED. R. EVID. 601. As Weinstein and Berger have commented:
Since Rule 601 abolishes all grounds for disqualifying a witness (except when
state law furnishes the rule of decision), a preliminary examination pursuant
to Rule 104(a) for the purpose of determining competency is usually no longer
required. This does not mean, however, that the trial judge no longer has
any power to keep a witness from testifying. It merely means that the judge
must focus on the proferred testimony rather than the proposed witness;
instead of ruling on the basis of competency the judge must recast the
problem in terms of relevancy.
3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 8, S 601[04~ at 26.
42. Rule 401 states: '''Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID.
401. Although relevant, some evidence may be excluded on preliminary examination under
Rule 403 if "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403.
As Weinstein and Berger, however, have noted:
If there is doubt about the existence of unfair prejudice, confusion of issue,
misleading, undue delay, or waste of time, it is generally better practice to
admit the evidence taking necessary precautions by way of contemporaneous
instructions to the jury followed by additional admonition in the charge.
1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EvIDENCE S 403[011, at 10 (1988).
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ordered psychiatric examinations or competency hearings of
witnesses-none, at least, on the theory that a preliminary
determination of competency must be made by the district
court.43

Since the adoption of the Federal Rules in 1979, the trial court's
refusal of a preliminary hearing has been affirmed in all cases in
which the competency of an adult witness was challenged j 44 the
sole case in which a hearing was held and a challenged witness
was found incompetent was reversed on appea1. 45 Thus, questions
about the past or current accuracy of a child witness' perceptions
are credibility issues to be tested by cross-examination and
weighed by the trier of fact. This federal approach to child
competency has now been adopted in fourteen states. 46
Under the no-inquiry approach of the Federal Rules, the voir
dire mechanism is now like an appendix, an atrophied vestigial
organ of problematic function. Perhaps the reliability risks of
adult witnesses justify this no-inquiry approach because data on
adults' unreliability may not be as compelling as the data regarding
children.47 We are still willing to presuppose that an adult's
43. United States v. Roach, 590 F.2d 181, 186 (5th Cir. 1979). However, the court notes
that a defendant might urge that a psychiatric examination is necessary to challenge the
credibility of the witness. Id. at n.9.
44. See, e.g., United States v. Gutman, 725 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1984) (trial court refused
to require psychiatric examination of government witness who had experienced incident
of mental illness year before trian; United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367, 384 (5th Cir.
1981) (trial court granted request for psychiatric examination regarding a witness' current
competency, but refused examination into mental condition at the time of the alleged
offenses); Shank v. Naes, 102 F.R.D. 14 (D. Kan. 1983) (trial court did not bar depositions
and interrogatories in motion for summary judgment despite deponent's mental incompetency).
45. United States v. Villalta, 662 F.2d 1205 (5th Cir. Dec. 1981) (accuracy of an
informant·witness' ability to speak Spanish challenged because his testimony concerned
negotiations conducted entirely in Spanish).
46. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 8, S 601[06]. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. §
906.01 (West 1975). According to the Wisconsin revision committee's notes, the adoption
of the federal approach
remove[s] from judicial determination the question of competency and admissibility; judicial determination of sufficiency and the jury assessment of
the weight and credibility survive. The effect of the change is the shift to
opponent's emphasis from a voir dire attack on competency to a crossexamination and introduction of refuting evidence as to weight and credibility.
[d. (Judicial Council Committee's Note). See State v. Olson, 113 Wis. 2d 249, 253, 335
N.W.2d 433, 436 (1983).
47. See Johnson & Foley, Differentiating Fact From Fantasy: The Reliability oj Children's Ml?mory, 40 J. Soc. ISSUES 33 (1984) (common assumption that children's reliability
is less than that of adult's).
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memory stabilizes rather closely in time to any occurrence and
that she can usually reproduce an account of her experiences
with comparable accuracy at tria1.48 Any special deficit of a
particular adult witness can be exposed by a face-to-face
confrontation with, and cross-examination by, the adverse party.
This seems to be an efficient judicial process because we are
comfortable making the critical assumption that testimony from
most adults is not flawed by substantial reliability risks.
In contrast, modern evidentiary machinery is grossly inefficient
if the time of the courts is wasted hearing children's testimony
entitled to little or no probative weight. The occasional inefficiency
of the unreliable adult witness may be tolerable49 but unreliable
child witnesses are a much more predictable phenomenon.50 The
Federal Rules fail to take this more frequent unreliability into
account.
The federal warts-and-all approach to witness credibility makes
critical assumptions about our legal process. First, it assumes
that the adversarial system produces equal prowess so that crossexamination will be conducted effectively. Second, it assumes
that cross-examination is capable of exposing the reliability risks

48. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1159 (2d Cir. 1979). Watson is
an example of the rare case in which such assumptions are explicitly expressed. Dissenting
from the panel opinion, Judge Friendly cites the work of Ebbinghaus, which states that
"memory declin[es] along an asymptotic curve, with most loss occurring within a few
days and almost no further decline in the time span here at issue [the five-year statute
of limitations]." Id. at 1159 n.l. (Friendly. J., dissenting). Judge Oakes challenged the
continuing validity of the Ebbinghaus curve, insofar as adult memory is concerned: "In
general ... 'psychologists no longer think in terms of the curve of forgetting. Forgetting
is a function of many factors and there are many curves of forgetting.' " United States
v. Muse, 633 F.2d 1041, 1052 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc) (Oakes, J., dissenting).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Hyson, 721 F.2d 856 (1st Cir. 1983). During the testimony
of an informant called as a prosecution witness in a drug distribution conspiracy trial,
defense counsel moved for a physical examination to determine whether the witness was
currently under the influence of drugs. The trial court demurred, simply asking the
witness whether he took drugs as a practice or had consumed any medication on this
particular day. On the second day, when the witness "had difficulty speaking," the court
inquired further and secured his consent to an examination. The examining physician
later testified that the witness had been under the influence of phencyclidine when
testifying which caused him to be in "an acute confusional state." The court ordered the
doctor's testimony and conclusions read to the jury and instructed them that the second
day's testimony was stricken and not to be considered. Id. at 683.
50. See, e.g., Chance & Goldstein, Face-Recognition Memory: Implications for Children's
Eyewitness Testimony, 40 J. Soc. IsSUES 69 (1984); Marin, Holmes, Guth & Kovac, The
Potential of Children as Eyewitnesses, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 295 (1979) [hereinafter
Children as Eyewitnesses].
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of any witness' testimony. In the case of child witnesses, both
assumptions further rest upon a shaky assumption that lawyers
are fully aware of the reliability risks inherent in children's
testimony.51
Third, the federal approach perhaps assumes that there are
strong professional restraints causing an attorney to reject some
potential witI\esses in advance based upon the attorney's
assessment of their likely unreliability.52 Cynics might observe
that counsel is checked only when she perceives her child witness
is unreliable and when that unreliability is likely to be
demonstrated by a knowledgeable opponent. In any case, the
federal approach presumes no efficiency gain from fashioning
legal incentives to screen potential witnesses more carefully.
Finally, the free-for-all no-inquiry rule gives very little guidance
to attorneys deciding whether to produce a child witness. More
importantly, the adoption of such a laissez-faire position means
that we must forego the opportunity to be more efficient in the
future. Echoing Wigmore, we can only continue to hear testimony
"for what it's worth." Established rules of evidence can cause
counsel to take pretrial precautions to ensure the probative value
of any witness. However, unless the inducements are sufficiently
high - an easier method of admissibility - or the costs are
51. In fact, extant studies of lawyers' awareness of social science data, including the
potential reliability risks in children's testimony, demonstrate that lawyers are only
slightly more knowledgeable than the average juror. See Note, UnrelWhle Eyewitness
El'idence: The Expert Psyclwlogist and the Defense in Criminal Cases, 45 LA. L. REV. 721,
736-37 (1985).
52. See, e.g., In re Schapiro, 144 A. D. I, 9, 128 N.Y.S. 852, 858 (1911) ("attorney is an
officer of the court upon whom rests the responsibility of preventing false or perjured
testimony and calling only those witnesses whom he believes to be truthful witnesses").
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct proscribe the knowing use of false or
perjured testimony. "A lawyer shall not knowingly ... offer evidence that the lawyer
knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its
falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(4) (1983). Similarly, "[a) lawyer shall not ... falsify evidence,
counselor assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is
prohibited by law." Id. at Rule 3.4(b).
An attorney is given discretion when confronted by potential testimony which he
reasonably believes might be false but does not actually know is false. In this more often
occurring situation, the Comments to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct offer only
equivocal guidance: "Generally speaking, a lawyer has authority to refuse to offer
testimony or other proof that the lawyer believes is untrustworthy. Offering such proof
may reflect adversely on the lawyer's ability to discriminate in the quality of evidence
and thus impair the lawyer's effectiveness as an advocate." Id. at Rule 3.3 comment 14.
Informal restraints, such as fears of drawing a reprimand or irritating the court, might
dissuade an attorney from offering testimony of doubtful probative value.
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sufficiently high-inadmissibility-the probative quality of
testimonial evidence is unlikely to improve.
II.

THE ApPROPRIATE USE OF THE VOIR DIRE

A. The Rules of Evidence as an Index of Skepticism
If the purpose of a trial is to discover the truth about some
disputed event or transaction, then the function of evidentiary
rules must be to sort unreliable from reliable evidence. 53 At the
risk of oversimplification, the rules of evidence are based on the
degree of skepticism evoked by particular types of proof.
Collectively, the rules operate to distinguish when evidence is
absolutely barred from consideration, when a threshold showing
of probative worth is required as a precondition for admissibility,
and when evidence is freely admitted.
The rules distinguish between testimonial evidence and
documentary or physical evidence. For certain non testimonial
evidence, the American system still requires demonstrations of
reliability such as foundational proofs of authenticity and accuracy.
As a result of Wigmore's still palpable influence, the clear trend
of the last century, however, has been to lower the barriers to
admission of testimonial evidence.
To illustrate this difference, compare the evidentiary rules'
treatment of a photograph with that given to eyewitness
testimony. A photograph becomes probative only upon proof that
it is accurate and truly represents what it purports to show. The
rules reflect skepticism about the accuracy of the camera's
resulting picture.54 Thus, threshold certification requires that the
photograph is an accurate portrayal by a witness who has
personally observed the scene or expert verification that the
process that produced the picture was reliable. The court must
be provided testimony that the machine was in good working
53. Of course, many of our evidentiary rules are premised upon the need to insulate
lay juries from unreliable, and hence prejudicial, forms of evidence. We are willing to
presuppose that seasoned judges are more immune to the prejudicial effects of unreliable
evidence when making their fact findings in bench trials. Required prevenient proofs can
insulate both a jury and judge from unreliable evidence.
54. Although photography is now a well-established process whose ordinary reliability
is commonly accepted, when the technology was new, elaborate prevenient proofs were
required. See, e.g., United States v. Hobbs, 403 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1968) (requiring
comparison between film negative and resulting print and proof that retouching by
manual or chemical means had not occurred).
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order and that nothing intervened during the film's development
to distort the image.55
If a witness verbally depicted the same scene, the rules do not
seek similar assurances of reliability before receiving the account
of his memory picture. Some testimonial reliability risks-specific
misperceptions like "seeing" a light blue car viewed at twilight
as beige-may not become apparent until the account is probed
by cross-examination or until it is contradicted by other witnesses.
These credibility risks are weighed most efficiently by the trier
of fact because the risks usually are not apparent in advance of
receiving the witness' testimony. More importantly, minor
testimonial discrepancies do not necessarily skew the reliability
of other aspects of the witness' account.
Other reliability risks involving complex judgments beyond the
capability of the average layman-such as asking a farmer the
speed of the jet immediately before it crashed into his pasturecan distort the truth of the testimony. This type of reliability
risk suggests the need for a special showing of expertise through
a truncated voir dire. Unless the necessary expertise is
demonstrated, the court will preclude this line of inquiry.56
Hearsay rules also utilize a mini-voir dire procedure.
Collectively, the hearsay rule, with all its grafted exceptions,
discriminates among types of out-of-court declarations. Unless
there is a threshold showing of exceptionality, we are content to
exclude such testimony because experience of centuries has
demonstrated substantial reliability risks in reporting out-of-court
statements. Each exception represents an a priori judgment that
a specific type of statement was made under circumstances that
overcome the general skepticism and insure the statement's
reliability.57
Still other reliability risks, such as memory-fade and memory
distortion, can infect a witness' entire account. This most serious
type of reliability risk suggests th at a threshold inquiry should
be conducted and, if it confirms the presence of wholesale
distortion, the court should exclude the testimony. We use the
shorthand term "incompetency" to refer to this last constellation
of factors which can produce wholly unreliable testimony.
4

55. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1), (9) and FED. R. EVID. 1001. For a discussion of these two
bases for admissibility, see 3 C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 214 (3d ed. 1984).
56. See FED. R. EVID. 701, 702; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 55, at § 13.
57. See FED. R. EVID. 801, 803, 804.
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B. The Function of the Voir Dire Process
Wigmore's competency inquiry 58 suggests a camera metaphor;
courts should treat human memories like photographs. Was the
camera capable of taking pictures - accuracy of sensory
perception? Was the photograph accurately processedrecollection? Is the resulting picture an accurate representation
of the observed scene-truthful communication? The problem
with this broad formulation, which persists today in jurisdictions
using competency examinations of children, is that it invites an
abstract evaluation of a witness' cognitive abilities without
providing guidance on how to assess the exceedingly complex
matters of human perception, recollection, and communication.
More troubling, as Wigmore's formulation goes, is the lack of
emphasis upon the most critical component, accurate recollection.
Few witnesses, including children, lack sensory perception and
the ability to communicate. Most witnesses, especially children,
experience memory-fade and potential memory distortion.
Despite the availability of the voir dire, the procedure is not
used to disqualify the entire testimony of a child witness by
states that follow the federal approach. Perhaps the most powerful
reason for not using testimonial voir dire, as it is currently
practiced, is because it does not focus on the real reliability risks
of children's testimony. Given our historic experience with such
a voir dire simulacrum, the federal approach might appear
preferable. Unless a preliminary showing is able to test for and
to eliminate a specific reliability risk, it is probably more efficient
to hear proffered testimony, consider the holes created by even
a bumbling cross-examination, and decide whether all, most, or
some facts are credible.
The voir dire mechanism will be an efficient sorting procedure
only if two requirements are met: first, we must be able to
identify with some precision those reliability risks in testimony
which ought to prevent admissibility of a witness' account; and
second, we must be able to design a brief interrogation which
will test for and eliminate specific reliability risks.

C. Reliability Risks in Children's Testimony
A considerable body of knowledge about the development of
human cognitive processes has developed during the past decade.
58. See supra text accompanying note 5.
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Children's capacity for observation and memory, skills critical to
competent testimony, has enjoyed a renaissance of social science
interest. 59 Overtime, seven reliability risks potentially inherent
in children's eyewitness accounts have been touted.60 These are:
lack of sensory capability; lack of attentiveness; perceptual deficits;
inability to perform complex cognitive tasks; propensity toward
fantasy, sometimes even a complete inability to differentiate real
and imagined events; memory-fade; and susceptibility to
suggestions, particularly those made by authority figures. 61
The first three risk factors, sense capacity, attentiveness, and
perception, all fall within Wigmore's capacity for observation
requirement. The empirical data of the last sixty years discount
any special, child-related risks insofar as sensory capability or
attentiveness is concerned.62 The five senses of sight, smell, touch,
hearing, and taste appear to be keenest in early childhood.
Similarly, developmental studies confirm that children are
attentive observers of their world. In fact, young children appear
to "encode" or make a more detailed initial mental record than
do adults. With age comes a tendency to attend only to the "core
details" of action. Adults ignore apparently irrelevant, peripheral
information.63 Because reality does not so neatly sort into relevant
59. The renewed interest in the memory capabilities of children was apparently
sparked by a symposium sponsored fifteen years ago by the Society for Research in
Child Development. For a retrospective summary of research from then until now, see
ORNSTEIN, Introduction: The Study of Children's Memory, in MEMORY DEVELOPMENT IN
CHILDREN 1-15 (P. Ornstein ed. 1978).
60. See generally 40 J. Soc. ISSUES 1 (G. Goodman ed. 1984). Existing social science
data is only briefly described in this Article. A more comprehensive analysis of the
reliability problems inherent in children's testimony is set out in McGough, For WJw,t It
May Be Worth: Enhancing the Probative Value of Children's Testinumy (1987) (available
through author). See also McGough & Hornsby, Reflections Upon Louisiana's Child Witness
ITideotaping Statute: Utility and Constitutionality in the Wake of Stincer, 47 LA. L. REV.
1255, 1258-61 (1987).
61. Psychic trauma has also been suggested by many experts as a potential memory
distorting factor. Discussion of this reliability risk has been omitted because no systematically conducted empirical studies exist. There is, however, a substantial body of
anecdotal and impressionistic literature. See Berliner & Barbieri, The Testimony of the
Child l'ictim of Sexual Assault, 40 J. Soc. ISSUES 125 (1984); Brown & Kulik, Flashbulb
Memories, 5 COGNITION 73 (1977); Pynoos & Eth, Develop-mental Perspective on Psychic
Tralwza in Childhood, in TRAUMA AND ITS WAKE 36 (C. Figley ed. 1984). If the child
witness has been the victim of some violence, this research indicates that the voir dire
should explore the possibility of traumatic distortion of the account and expert testimony
of evaluation should be freely received. See Terr, The Child As a Witness, in CHILD
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 207, 220 (D. Schetky & E. Benedek ed. 1980).
62. See Johnson & Foley, supra note 47 at 33-34.
63. See Neisser, The Control of Infornw.tion Pickup in Selective Looking, in PERCEPTION
AND ITS DEVELOPMENT: A TRmUTE TO ELEANOR J. GmsoN 201 (A. Pick ed. 19791; Johnson
& Foley, supra note 47, at 36.
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and irrelevant detail, a child may be the only witness capable of
providing a fact critical to resolving a legal dispute.
The third risk concern, perceptual acuity, is more complicated.
Any account of an observation is dependent upon the mental
ability to label the items or events observed and to sort sensory
intake into categories similar to those used by others making
the same observations. The older, more worldly wise person
possesses a larger, more sophisticated mental sorting mechanism
than a toddler. Yet, on sorting tasks, such as color, elemental
identifying characteristics, and basic object categorization, even
four-year-olds appear to be reliable in their use of descriptive
data which they do in fact recall. 64
The fourth reliability risk, children's inability to undertake
cognitively complex tasks such as estimating speed or distance,
is demonstrably real. Beginning with Piaget's research,65 young
children have been shown to be unreliable when asked to make
judgments involving relativity or comparison. Furthermore, recent
data suggest that mastery of time and space assessments occurs
significantly later than at ages seven or eight as Piaget
postulated.66 Most trial court judges are intuitively aware of this
cognitive limitation and would suppress any attempt to elicit such
testimony from a child. Thus, this reliability risk does not pose
any practical difficulty for the legal system and does not imperil
the validity of children's descriptive testimony.
The empirical data on these four factors suggests that if
counsel, judge, and jury were summoned to the side of a sixyear-old immediately following an event and then questioned her
about what she had seen, heard, or smelled in categorical language
she could understand, they should attribute great weight to her
account. Indeed, they should prefer her account to that of a
similarly situated adult unless the dispute involves anchovies or
camshafts or other phenomena presumably beyond her ken.
Unfortunately, there is usually no early examination of a child
witness, and disputes that ripen into lawsuits rarely come to trial
quickly. These facts of life force us to confront the most serious
reliability risks-memory-fade, fantasizing, and suggestibility.
64. Perlmutter & Ricks, RecaU in Preschool Children, 27 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD
PSYCHOLOGY 423, 432-35 (1979).
65. See J. PIAGET, THE CHILD'S CONCEPTION OF TIME (1927); J. PIAGET, THE CHILD'S
CONCEPTION OF MOVEMENT AND SPEED (1946).
66. Siegler & Richards, DeveWpment oj Time, Speed, and Distance Concepts, 15 DEV.
PSYCHOLOGY 288 (1979).
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Indeed, all other potential risks of unreliability pale in comparison
to memory-fade.
Human memory has three distinct stages, acquisition-the
intake of data about an observed event, retention - the period of
time during which the perceived data are stored in the mind,
and retrieval-the process by which the stored data is recalled
by the observer. 67 A weakness during any of these stages
diminishes memory.
Individuals suffer memory loss and, upon reflection, can usually
identify a cause. "Acquisition stage" failure occurs when the
individual was not paying attention to what was said or done, or
was watching some new or unfamiliar activity.68 "Retention stage"
failure occurs when the event took place long ago and was no
longer fresh so details had slipped away. Even if the events
themselves were memorable, the circumstances surrounding the
questioning may have been misunderstood or occurred during a
time of distraction or tension, resulting in "retrieval stage"
failures. We acknowledge that adult memory occasionally can fail
because of these variables; there is now a significant body of
research indicating that children's memory is weaker and more
fragile than adults' at each of these stages.69
The greatest difference between adult and child memory occurs
in retention. Scientists agree that children are able to recall less
information than adults when a significant period of time has
passed before they are asked to relate the event.70 However, the
finding that children's "long-term" memory is weak is especially
striking because "long-term" memory, to a social scientist, is
likely to mean only a few weeks or even a day.71 It seems plausible
67. Loftus & Davies, Distortions in the Memory of Children, 40 J. Soc. ISSUES 52, 54
(1984).
68. Some research indicates that the more familiar a child is with certain events, the
greater the retention of specific details. See Chi, Knowledge Structures and Memory
Deo'elopment, in CHILDREN'S THINKING: WHAT DEVELOPS? 73 (R. Siegler ed. 1978).
69. See Loftus & Davies, supra note 67, at 54. ''{I]n general, children have greater
difficulty than adults in retrieving information from long·term memory." For further
confirmation that memory·fade appears to be age'related, see ORNSTEIN, supra note 59.
70. Chance & Goldstein, supra note 50, at 79-80.
71. See, e.g., Dempster, Conditions Affecting Retention Test Performance: A Develop·
mental Study, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 65, 68 (1984) (24 hours); Cohen &
Harnick, The Susceptibility of Child Witnesses to Suggestion, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 201,
204 (1980) (5 days); Bach & Underwood, Developmental Changes in Memory Attributes, 61
J. EDUC. PSYCHOLOGY 202, 293 (1979) (48 hours); Children as Eyewitnesses, supra note 50,
at 298 (30 minutes and 2 weeks); Hasher & Thomas, A Deve/opmental Study of Retention,
9 DEV. PSYCHOLOGY 281, 281 (1973) (1 week).
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that significant delay before recall creates a serious risk of
unreliability in the trial testimony of children. 72
Furthermore, a strand of memory weakened over time is more
susceptible to twisting or fragmentary substitution of key links
resulting from either the child's own imaginative reconstruction
or the influence of others. The delay-ridden legal system should
be greatly concerned by data indicating that children are more
prone to memory self-distortion or to memory manipulation by
influential persons than are adults.
Fantasizing by child witnesses has been suspected for
centuries.73 Until recently, few empirical studies examined a
child's inability to distinguish real from imagined events. Social
scientists now believe that children do not have a generalized
inability to make this distinction. The most intriguing finding is
that confusion between remembered actual events and imagined
events varies according to the type of action recalled. For example,
children displayed significant difficulty, which decreased with
age, in distinguishing between their own thoughts or plans
(imagined speech and action) and what they actually said or did. 74
Consequently, the reported research serves at least to caution
us that a child's account of what he said or did at a particular
moment in the past needs to be well probed for imagined action.
Nonetheless, after ten years of research on fantasy,
experimental psychologists concede that perhaps the inquiry most
critical to the legal system has yet to be conducted:
An important question, both for theory and for courtroom
testimony, is whether children only have difficulty with mem-

72. Although some additional memory loss occurs as time passes, a simple linear
extrapolation may not be appropriate. It is possible, though as yet unproved, that after
an initial sharp decline, children's memory stabili2es rather quickly after an initial sharp
loss just as was once thought true of adult memory. See Hutchins & Schlesinger, SfYTlU!
Observations on the Law of Evidence-Memory, 42 HARV. L. REV. 860, 866 (1928). But there
is a lack of research on the impact of lengthy delays upon the memory capacity of
children.
73. As Sir James Fitzjames Stephen commented in 1863:
[Fantasy is] a considerable evil, for infancy the strength of the imagination
is out of all proportion to the powers of the other faculties; and children
constantly say what is not true, not from deceitfulness, but simply because
they have come to think so, by talking or dreaming what has passed.
J. STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 287 (1863).
74. See Johnson & Foley, supra note 47 at 37 -38. A striking finding of these studies
is that a child apparently encounters no difficulty in distinguishing between what he
actually saw or heard another do or say from the other's actions or speech that the child
was asked to imagine. See id. at 44.
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ories that involve themselves as agents or whether the same
pattern would be found with another agent. Would children
have the same difficulty separating what they saw someone
else do from what they only imagined that person doing? We
are currently investigating this question. 75

Even greater concern is raised by the empirical data on
children's suggestibility. In five recently reported experiments,
children observed a film or a live enactment of a scene and then
were questioned.76 Suggestive questions based on incorrect facts
were interjected to see if the child's personal recall remained
unshakable. Only one of these studies concluded that children
were not significantly more prone to suggestibility than young
adults. 77 The other studies found a correlation between
suggestibility and age. 78 It should be underscored that none of
these memory accuracy or suggestibility experiments tested
children after a retention period greater than two weeks.79

III.

REFORM OF THE CHILD WITNESS QUALIFICATION PROCESS

A. Refurbishing the Administration of the Oath
Experimentation with the rituals used to deter false accusations
has almost come full circle. The Anglo-American tradition began
with no oath and we counted on earthly punishment to deter
perjury - trial by ordeal and trial by combat. Only later was
perjury made a crime and a witness was required to demonstrate
an appreciation for divine retribution before giving testimony.so
Now the trend is toward reducing the oath to sheer liturgy.S!
75. !d. at 45.
76. See Loftus & Davies. supra note 67. at 59-62.
77. Children as Eyewitnesses. supra note 50. at 304.
78. Loftus & Davies. supra note 67. at 59-62.
79. ld. at 63.
80. See Rowley, supra note 12. at 487-88.
81. The ABA Committee on the Improvement of the Law of Evidence suggested
modifications in procedure that arguably would enhance only the ritual function of the
oath. The Committee concluded that to
ensure the maximum efficacy of the oath: (1) It should be administered by
the jUdge. not the clerk (2) It should be repeated word for word by the
witness (3) It should be administered anew to each witness on coming to the
stand. not to a group and in advance and (4) The judge and all persons in
the courtroom should stand while the oath is pronounced.
3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER. supra note 8, § 603[1], at 6-7 (summarizing 63 REP. OF
THE AM. B. A. 586 (1938)).
However. the Advisory Committee in its Note to Rule 603 did not adopt even these
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Predictably, the next change will be the elimination of the oath
altogether from trial procedures.
An oath serves three functions: an evidentiary function to
provide a foundation for later prosecution for perjury; a cautionary
function to remind the witness of the enforceable demand for
truth; and a ritual function to establish solemnity for the witness'
forthcoming role in the trial's search for truth and to underscore
the cautionary function. 82 If the witness approaches the stand
unaware of his enforceable duty to give truthful testimony, both
the cautionary and ritual functions of the oath are arguably
inoperative.
Insofar as adult witnesses are concerned, the law may well
indulge in its favorite fiction that every person is presumed to
know the law, including the prohibition against perjury. That
same presumption ought not apply with equal vigor when a child
witness is before the court. The duty of a child witness to report
accurately requires some minimal instruction from the court
concerning the potential penalties for false testimony.
Empirical studies support the conclusion that moral development
progresses with increasing age from the most primitive stage of
reward-gain and punishment-avoidance to the adult conscience.83
Even preschoolers quickly learn to modify their behavior when
they can associate, through appropriate warnings, a proscribed
action with certain costs. Although other types of appeals, such
as the approval of important adults or calls for justice or fairness
may induce truthfulness in older children, the earliest acquired

modest suggestions. In fact, the Note provides no clue about either the content of the
oath or the procedures to be followed in the administration of the oath. Furthermore.
it is unlikely that many courts will follow suggestions (1) and (4). (2) may
add something and might well be followed. though it is not in many courts.
The main point to be observed in most courts is that the clerk who admin·
isters the oath take it seriously. He should stand upright. face the witness
and repeat the oath from memory slowly and deliberately. While the oath
is taken the judge should put aside all his other work. face the witness and
observe his demeanor in a way that makes it clear the court expects him to
tell the truth.
ld. at 7. That only such minimal advice is thought viable underscores the virtual emptiness
of today's oath requirement.
82. This classification scheme is borrowed from Gulliver & Tilson. Classification of
Gratuitous Transfers. 51 YALE L.J. 1 (1941) (applying classification scheme to probate
law). For a historical overview of the purpose of an oath. see In re R.R .• 79 N.J. 97. 10711.398 A.2d 76. 81-82 (1979).
83. See, e.g.• T. LICKONA. supra note 28. at 12. The six stages of moral development
proposed by Lickona are summarized by Perry & Teply. supra note 22. at 1387.
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internalization-avoidance of punishment-is not extinguished by
later moral development.84
For example, we still make appropriate use of "deterrent
effect" when we sanction the violation of general rules of adult
human conduct. Consequently, notice of penalties for false
testimony is a valid means of capturing the moral sensibilities of
all children who are to serve as witnesses.
Although criminal perjury penalties apply if cross-examination
or other evidence proves testimony false, the usual oath does
not include even a reminder that truth is an enforceable societal
demand.8s Perjury is a crime in every American jurisdiction and
is now included within every state's definition of a delinquent
act.86 It does not matter that child witnesses may be below the
age of criminal accountability. If we are seriously concerned about
truthful accounts, aside from issues of the accuracy of the original
perceptions, we ought to be prepared to file delinquency charges
against any properly warned child who knowingly gives false
testimony.
The cautionary aspect of the oath is essential to reinforce the
oath's significance for child witnesses. Due process may require
notice of potential punishments for perjury before a child testifies.
Although there is no similar duty to warn an adult before he
commits a crime, surely there is a heightened duty to insure that
a child is fairly apprised of the consequences of falsity when she
is placed in jeopardy.87 Notice of criminality might also be required
as part of a threshold showing of the willfulness element in any
subsequent perjury prosecution.

84. ld. at 17.
85. See State v. Zamorsky, 170 N.J. Super. 198, 406 A.2d 192 (1979). The appellate
court affirmed the admissibility of testimony of a six-year-old victim, despite the fact
that she had not been administered a formal oath. The voir dire clearly elicited information
that the child realized that "little girls that don't tell the truth" get "punished" and thus
served the purpose of the administration of the oath. ld. at 202, 406 A.2d at 194.
86. See, e.g., TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. S 51.03(c) (Vernon 1986) ("Nothing in this title
prevents criminal proceedings against a child for perjury."); UNIF. JUVENILE COURT ACT,
S 2(2) (1987) (defining a "delinquent act" as "an act designated a crime under the law,
including local [ordinances or resolutions] of this state, or of another state if the act
occurred in that state, or under federal law"). Cj. Note, The Competency of Children as
Witnesses, 39 VA. L. REV. 358, 368-69 (1953) (reviewing early precedent holding that
children could not be punished for the offense of perjury).
87. The due process rights of a child defendant to notice and the privilege against
self-incrimination were recognized in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)' See generally S. DAVIS,
RIGHTS OF JUVENILES, 5-1-5-49 (rev. ed. 1986).
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Perhaps the two most important adjustments in current practice
should be that the oath administration format be one of instruction
rather than interrogation and the responsibility for securing oath
awareness should shift from counsel to the court. The court
should inform any child witness, in words the child can
comprehend, that she is expected to answer truthfully all questions
asked. The court should instruct the child explicitly that if she
does not know the answer to any question, the court will expect
her to say that she does not know the answer rather than guess
about what might have happened. A substantial body of research
on child interviewing shows that children often misperceive a
duty to supply an answer to every question.BB While knowledgeable
counsel already may have given this instruction to a child witness,89
it is important to have it authoritatively underscored by the
court. The court should also reassure the child that she should
not worry about how others receive what she has to say or
attempt to please the lawyers, the judge, or anyone else in giving
her testimony. Instead, she should give only those facts which
88. Although empirical siata demonstrates this tendency in children, researchers
disagree why it occurs. Some attribute this tendency to the "demand characteristic" of
all direct questioning. For example, asking a child whether a person had blonde, brunette,
or black hair indirectly suggests that hair color is important and something she should
be able to provide. An adult may resist this implicit demand; a younger child may
misinterpret the interviewer's intentions and end up providing what he or she feels is
an appropriate answer." Dent & Stephenson, An Experimental Study of the E..tJectit'eness
of Different Techniques of Questioning Child Witnesses, 18 BRIT. J. OF Soc. AND CLINICAL
PSYCHOLOGY 41-51, summarized in King & Yuille, Suggestibility and the Child Witness,
in CHILDREN'S EYEWITNESS MEMORY 24, 27 (S. Ceci, M. Toglia & D. ROBB ed. 1987).
Other researchers have attributed this tendency to the child's developing ability to
make inferences. Children struggle to bring order out of confusion, to make sense of
questions, and to provide answers to adults' questions. Researchers interviewed five· and
seven-year-olds using nonsensical questions, such as "Is milk bigger than water?" or "Is
red heavier than yellow?" An adult predictably would at best be puzzled, or at worst,
refuse to answer the question while perhaps exhibiting some anger at such a waste of
his time. In contrast, "virtually all the children responded in a serious, reasoned manner,
stating for example, 'Milk is bigger because it has more color' or 'Yellow is heavier
because the red cushion is smaller than the yellow cushion there.' " Hughes & Grieve,
On Asking Children Bizarre Questions, in EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION
(M. Donaldson, R. Grieve & C. Pratt ed. 1980).
89. Counsel is advised to prepare a child for croBB-examination by cautioning him not
to guess:
The child should be told that it is acceptable to say, "I don't know." Unlike
at school, where "I don't know" gets the child in trouble, in the courtroom
the child is not required to know the answer to every question. The child
may be told that if a question is confusing or incomprehensible, the child
can ask the cross-examiner to repeat the question.
J. MYERS, CHILD WITNESS LAW AND PRACTICE 46 (1987).
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she personally remembers. 90 The child is not responsible for the
outcome of the trial; she is responsible only for telling accurately
what she knows about the dispute. Finally, the court should
instruct the child that if she gives false testimony, she could
become subject to juvenile court prosecution for perjury and
would face appropriate penalties.91
The prospect of relating such sophisticated concepts to a child
in language appropriate to his understanding is daunting to those
who have not had occasion to do so. Most juvenile court judges,
however, are highly skilled in interacting with children in court
and their expertise should be sought to devise pattern instructions
adaptable to the needs of particular cases. We already require
juvenile courts to "Boykinize"92 a delinquent child who seeks to
90. Recent data indicates that younger children are significantly more likely than
older children to embellish their recall of an event with unobserved but likely detail. In
interpreting such findings. one researcher provides this advice:
[l]f third·graders add more extraneous information to their recall because
they assume that "more" means "better." and try to please an adult by
increasing the size of their production. then they should be cautioned against
this tendency with prequestioning instructions. The child could be warned
that the investigator does not want more information but rather accurate
information. It may be that. given such instructions. young children can
reduce their additions. in contrast to children who did not receive these
instructions.
Saywitz. Children's Testimony: Age·Related Patterns of Memory Errors. in CmLDREN'S
EYEWITNESSES MEMORY 47 (S. Ceci. M. Toglia & D. Ross ed. 1987).
91. See. e.g.• Payne v. State. 487 So. 2d 256. 263 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986). A mentally
impaired fifteen-year-old was permitted to testify after the trial court had conducted a
voir dire and had instructed the child on the law of perjury:
I want you to listen carefully. There is such a thing in law called perjury.
And perjury is the giving of testimony that is false. once one has taken an
oath in Court to tell the truth. nothing but the truth. the whole truth. If
one. having sworn and taken an oath. that they will tell the truth before a
Court. then intentionally misrepresents the facts by telling a lie. to any
question asked in the Court. he can be found guilty of the crime of perjury.
and for that offense as an adult could be imprisoned. or as a juvenile could
also be detained. the equivalence of being imprisoned. So. I instruct you that
is the penalty for the offense of perjury. You are expected to tell the truth
at all times to all questions that are asked you. I have concluded. though.
he is competent to testify as a witness before the Court.
!d. at 263. The problem with this attempted instruction is that it is probably only vaguely
understood by this defendant or any other child. Further translation into simpler language
is needed.
92. In Boykin v. Alabama. 395 U.S. 238 (1969). the Court held that the trial court
must conduct an examination into voluntariness. including "an attempt to satisfy itself
that the defendant understands the nature of the charges. his right to a jury trial. the
acts sufficient to constitute the offenses for which he is charged and the permissible
range of sentences" in order to insure that a guilty plea was voluntarily entered. !d. at
244 n.7 (quoting Commonwealth ex ret. West v. Rundle. 428 Pa. 102. 105-06. 237 A.2d
196. 197 -98 (19881.

Published by Reading Room, 1989

HeinOnline -- 5 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 585 1988-1989

29

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 3

586

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vo1.5:557

enter a guilty plea, including instructions about the maximum
and minimum penalties which can be imposed.93 Basic instruction
about the duties imposed by the oath is a much less complicated
task than apprising a child of the waiver of rights guaranteed
by the Constitution.

B. Refocusing the Voir Dire
Modern empirical data on reliability risks do not indicate that
the ancient disqualification of children as a class is justified. The
data do permit us, however, to refine our assessment of the
reliability risks peculiar to children.
Data on memory-fade and children's heightened susceptibility
to imagining and suggestion point to the need for pretrial
processes that would insure recording children's accounts soon
after observed events. Many states already have enacted special
videotaping statutes which make such early recordings admissible
into evidence.94 Most of these states, however, confine videotaping
procedures to criminal prosecutions,95 or narrower still, to sexual
abuse prosecutions. 96 Furthermore, many states,97 including
93. See, e.g., In re Jarrell, 395 So. 2d 1382 (La. Ct. App.), 1'ev'd, 399 So. 2d 583 (La.
Supp. 1981).
94. ALA. CODE S 15-25-2 (Supp. 1988); ALASKA STAT. S 12.45.047 (1984): ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. S 134251 to -4253 (Supp. 1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. S 16-44·203 (1987): CAL.
PENAL CODE S 1346 (West 1982); CoLO. REV. STAT. S 18·3-413 (1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. S
92.53 to .55 (West Supp. 1989): HAW. REV. STAT. S 626 Rule 616 (1985): KAN. CRIM. PROC.
CODE ANN. S 22-3434 (Vernon Supp. 1989): Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. S 421.350 (MichieiBobbs·
Merrill Supp. 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. S 15.440.1 to .6 (West Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT.
S 595.02(3), (4) (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. S 45-15-401 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. S 174.227
(Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. S 517:13-a (Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. S 30-9-17
(1984): N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW S 190.32 (McKinney 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, S 753
(West Supp. 1989): R.I. GEN. LAWS S 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. S
23A-12-9 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. S 24-7-116 (Supp. 1987); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. S
38.071 (Vernon Supp. 1989); VT. R. EVID. 807 (Supp. 1988): WIS. STAT. ANN. S 967.04(7)(a)
(West Supp. 1988).
95. See, e.g., California, New York, and Texas statutes cited in supra note 94. The
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws struck a strange middle course by permitting
videotapes as an exception to the hearsay rule in cases in which a child witness was to
give testimony about "sexual conduct or physical violence performed by or with another
on or with that minor or any [other person]." UNIF. R. EVID. 807(a)(j) (adopted Nov. 1986).
96. See Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Montana, New Mexico, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, and Vermont statutes cited supra note 94.
97. ALASKA STAT. S 12.40.110 (Supp. 1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. S 13-1416 (Supp.
1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. S 16-41-101(25)(a) (1987); CAL. EvID. CODE S 1228 (West Supp. 1989);
COLO. REV. STAT. S 18-3-411(3) (1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. S 90.803 (West Supp. 1989); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, S 115-10 (Smith-Hurd 1986); IND. CODE ANN. S 35-39-4-6 (Burns 1985);
KAN. CIV. PROC. CODE S 60-460(dd) (Vernon Supp. 1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. S 421.355
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Georgia, have recently expanded the hearsay exceptions to permit
the admission of children's statements of abuse provided the
court finds that "the circumstances of the statement provide
sufficient indicia of reliability."98 If, as the data suggest, a child's
memory is most reliable when it is fresh, these special procedures
for capturing and preserving the child's early account should be
expanded to all types of legal proceedings.99
In litigation lacking a videotaped record of a child's early
statement, the voir dire is the next best mechanism available for
determining if distortions exist, albeit after the fact. Despite
convincing empirical data, the federal approach totally discounts
the possibility of any inherent reliability risks in the testimony
of child witnesses. The "oath understanding" voir dire similarly
permits an abstract avowal of the truth to override such inherent
reliability risks, that is, distortions over which even the most
God-fearing child may have no control. The "full inquiry" voir
dire is not reliability risk specific; it allows a court to ask the
right questions, but it also permits many wrong ones which have
little or no bearing upon testimonial accuracy.
The limited voir dire of a child witness is appropriate but its
focus should be on the presence of the interrelated reliability
risks of memory-fade and its bedfellows fantasization and
suggestibility. A brief inquiry focused on the opportunities for
distortion that may have occurred between the observation and
the trial can resolve these concerns. The burden of laying a
foundation of reliability should be on the party offering the child's
testimony into evidence. An appropriate statute or court rule
might read:
Admissibility of Children's Testimony. No child shall be permitted to testify unless the court finds after preliminary

!MichieiBobbs·Merrill Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, S 1205 (Supp. 1988); MINN.
STAT. S 595.02(3) (1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. S 491.075 (Vernon Supp. 1989); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. S 51.385 (Michie 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-16·38 (1987); TEX. CRIlII. PROC.
CODE ANN. S 38.072 (Vernon Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76·5-411 (Supp. 1988); VT. R.
EVID. 804(a) (Supp. 1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (1988).
98. O.C.G.A. S 24·3-16 (Supp. 1988). Georgia's statute derives from the Washington
statute which has served as a prototype for many other jurisdictions. WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. S 9A.44.120 (Supp. 1984).
99. Reform of the pretrial processes is another subject to be explored. It is sufficient
to suggest here that enhancing the reliability of children's testimony requires changes in
both the pretrial processes and the voir dire procedure. See McGough & Hornsby, supra
note 60, at 1300-03 for some suggested reforms.
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examination, that the child is able to give reliable testimony
based on the following criteria:
(1) The age of the child at trial and age at the time of the
observed event or transaction;
(2) The length of time between the observation and the
child's first report to an adult;
(3) The circumstances and results of all interviews, including
recorded interviews which are not being offered as evidence,
which have been conducted with the child about his observations by anyone, including those conducted by members of
the child's family;
(4) Any variations in the child's account which have occurred in the interval between the first report and the trial;
(5) Evidence concerning the motive, inclination, and opportunity for any interviewer to influence the child's current
proposed trial testimony;
(6) The existence of other apparent motives of the child to
falsify; and
(7) The existence of corroborating evidence that the child
had the opportunity to observe the event in question. tOO

If substantial time has elapsed since the observed event, the
trial court should properly be concerned about a child's recall
ability. If coaching is suspected, the court also should question
any adults suspected of influencing the child. lol As one
commentator has cautioned:
[H]uman memory does not operate like a camera, gathering
every detail for later recall exactly as it was perceived.
Rather, it is an active, reconstructive process in which images
are constantly altered through the integration of new experiences and interpretations. A person can unknowingly integrate post-event information to fill gaps or replace forgotten
or poorly remembered details, with imagination frequently
playing a significant role. The result can be distorted or
totally incorrect recall. t02

IV.

CONCLUSION

Debates on competency and the voir dire have focused on the
wrong issues. The struggle of the last two centuries has concerned
100. The catalyst for this proposal is contained in the official comments to UNIF. R.
EVID. 807, 13A U.L.A. 237 (Supp. 1989).
101. See Davis v. State, 348 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
102. Comment, Um'eliahle Eyewitness Evidence: The Expert Psychologi$t and tk Defense
in Criminal Cases, 45 LA. L. REV. 721,724 (1985).
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whether special prevenient proofs for child witnesses ought to
be abandoned altogether or, instead, retained for some limited
purpose, though that purpose has never been well-defined. The
classic approach of legal commentary has been to analyze the
substantive components of truthful testimony using Wigmore's
categories: capacity for observation, recollection, communication,
and moral responsibility.
This Article proposes an oath ceremony that would establish
a meaningful dialogue between the trial court and the child. The
role of the court should shift from being merely an arbiter of
the adequacy of counsel's interrogation of the child to being the
child's advisor who explains the nature of the duty imposed by
the oath. The proposed voir dire makes a fundamental and
appropriate shift in focus from determining a child's general
capacity at the time of trial to the pretrial processes used to
receive or record his account and the opportunities, if any, for
distorting his memory. The focus should be on the narrow issue
of reliability risk assessment rather than on some abstract notion
of age-related competence. The potential distortions of memoryfade, fantasization, and suggestibility deserve to be treated as
substantial matters for serious pretestimony inquiry.
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